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In this paper, growth of per capita income can be exogenous and/or 
endogenous due to aggregate public infrastructure spillover. The deterministic 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) model is augmented in this paper to produce a 
stochastic growth counterpart, which has useful time series implications.  In 
particular, the model implies certain testable cointegration properties that 
have a bearing on the role of public capital and endogenous growth.  The 
postulation of strict endogenous growth is tested empirically for Australia 
using a constructed annual data set for the period 1930/31 to 1990/91.  This 
hypothesis is rejected, as there is evidence of a long-run cointegrating 
relationship about a deterministic trend implying exogenous growth with 
public capital spillovers.  Short-run impulse response analysis is performed 
using a reduce- form model incorporating the cointegrating equation as the 
error correction term.  There is further short run evidence of the role for 
public capital accumulation in contributing to permanent increases in the 
levels of per capita income and private capital. 
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I  Introduction 
  In this paper, the role played by public infrastructure in the long- and medium-
term growth of an economy is considered.  This issue is of particular interest in an era 
of shrinking government spending and privatisation.  The conventional textbook 
argument is that a government is able to provide certain public goods that benefit an 
economy as a whole and which no private enterprise will be willing to produce 
without monopoly gain.  Furthermore, it may be that certain categories of public 
infrastructure do enter directly as inputs into private production.  (Examples of these 
are roads, highways and also legal courts.)  If so, models from the New Growth 
literature such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and Barro (1990) may be relevant to 
the issue.  This class of models shows that growth in the long run can be perpetual and 
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1 this is due to the endogenous effect of government spending driving the growth in 
private productivity. 
   In fact the role of public capital as distinct from private capital in fostering 
growth in the context of theoretical growth models has received some attention as 
early back as Arrow and Kurz (1970).  Recent models are found in Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1994) and Barro (1990).  In particular, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) 
show in a deterministic model that allowing for the possibility of varying degrees of 
non-rivalry or congestion in what is otherwise non-exclusive public infrastructure 
does not affect the optimal tax rate in a system of uniform capital and labour taxation. 
The influence of public infrastructure on private production in the empirical 
literature is known as the public capital debate, which began with the seminal work of 
Aschauer (1989a).  Aschauer’s method of estimating a single aggregate production 
function, which incorporates public capital stock, was first adapted for Australian 
studies by Otto and Voss (1994a).  Both papers found that there was a significantly 
large elasticity of output with respect to public capital (in the order of 0.40).  Their 
methodology was not without criticism. The critiques range from claims of possible 
endogeneity of the public capital variable to the ad hoc nature of imposing a 
production function.
1   
It is maintained in this paper that the production function approach is still valid 
and not ad hoc, albeit subject to a different interpretation. As argued by Flores de 
Frutos  et al (1998) the production function can be interpreted as a long-run 
relationship between output, and the private and public inputs.  In order to facilitate 
this interpretation, the Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) model is modified into a 
stochastic growth model, which then yields testable time series properties.  That is, 
the stochastic growth model with public infrastructure spillovers implies cointegrating 
relationship(s) between per capita output, private capital and public infrastructure 
capital which can be tested using the method of Johansen (1991, 1995).  In doing so 
Lau and Sin (1997) will be followed in an application to Australian data.  However, 
Lau and Sin (1997) consider a similar model for U.S. data.  Furthermore, this paper 
compares results for short- to medium-term effects of public infrastructure with 
existing VAR studies such as Otto and Voss (1996) from the perspective of a vector 
error correction model nesting a theory-implied cointegrating relationship. There have 
2 not been any published studies utilising the vector error correction to study this issue 
for Australia.
2 
  The paper is thus arranged: A stochastic growth version of the Glomm and 
Ravikumar model and the time series basis of the production function framework is 
derived in Section II.  Section III contains the estimation and test of the hypothesis of 
strict endogenous growth within the cointegrating relationship.  Impulse response 
analysis and variance decomposition using the vector error-correction structure is 
enumerated in Section IV.  The paper concludes with Section V. 
 
II  A Stochastic Growth Model with Public Capital Spillovers 
A stochastic growth version of the Glomm and Ravikumar model is presented 
in this section.  In this framework, a representative household-worker chooses an 
optimal consumption path to maximise expected lifetime utility, given resource 
constraints and taking government policy as given.  The public policy objective is 
assumed to be the maximisation of the household’s optimal path of consumption, 
subject to technological constraints and a periodic balanced budget à la Barro (1990).  
 
(i)  Technology and household choice 
Assume that the aggregate production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form 
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where the lower case variables, y and k, denote per worker (L) output and private 
capital respectively.  The Harrod-neutral rate of technological progress is denoted by 
x.  Thus, the model nests the possibilities of exogenous and/or endogenous growth.  
The production technology is subject to random shocks,  , assumed to be 





, enters as an input into 
production (implying the spillover or externality effect) and it is taken by the 
representative agent as given.  Further, aggregate public capital is subject to 
                                                                                                                                            
1 See Sturm (1998, pp. 57-65) for a survey. See e.g. Lynde and Richmond (1991) and Berndt and 
Hansson (1991). 
2 c.f. Otto and Voss (1994b).  However, their results were not so robust to impulse response analysis 
and the VEC model was later rejected in Otto and Voss (1996). 



















G .       (2) 
This is contrary the usual notion that public goods are non-exclusive and non-rival. 
The equilibrium of the economy in this model is solved by an artificial social 
planner's problem.
3   To be able to obtain solutions that contain a stationary 
equilibrium equation (1) can be written in per efficiency unit worker terms as: 
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where per efficiency unit variables are denoted by a hat, “
∧”.  Assume that there is 100 
per cent depreciation at the end of each period for private capital.  This assumption 
merely facilitates analytical tractability in the model.  Then private per capita 
investment will give the following period’s capital stock 
           ( 4 )  
K
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where i is per capita investment and   is a random shock to investment.  Similarly, 
aggregate public infrastructure investment is assumed to depreciate fully at the end of 
the period: 
K
t 1 + ε
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where I
G is aggregate public expenditure on infrastructure.  
The household maximises expected lifetime utility subject to resource 
constraints conditional on available information and supplies one unit of labour 
inelastically to production.  Thus the household solves 
      (6)  )
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3 At equilibrium, each agent's desired level of the public good, Git, is consistent with all other agent's 
votes for the same such that  
  Git = Gt   .  i ∀
4 where τ  is the uniform income tax rate.  It is shown in Appendix A, by restating the 
problem in equation (6) as a dynamic program, that the solution to the household 
problem taking government policy as given, yields the optimal paths of consumption 
and private capital:
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(ii)  Public Sector 
The government budget is given by expenditure on public investment which is 
financed by what is equivalently a uniform tax on capital and labour incomes in a 
decentralized equilibrium: 
  .          ( 9 )     t t
G
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That is, the benevolent government maximises household welfare when it maximises 
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{ , for some value of η ≥ 1, to ensure that the infinite 
horizon household objective is bounded above for all feasible consumption paths.  In 





                                                 
4 See generally Stokey and Lucas (1989). 
5 (iii)  Optimal Public Policy  
Solving the government’s problem by dynamic programming (Appendix B), it 
is found that the optimal tax rate is a function of constants.
5  Specifically, the optimal 
tax rate is defined by the function 
  t t ∀ = ; θβ τ                        (11) 
Thus, the optimal tax rate is equal to the one-period discounted share of public capital 
in output, where the government faces the same subjective discount rate, β, as the 
household. 
  Second, given the optimal choice of public policy, the evolution of private 
capital per efficiency unit worker in equation (8) can be described by the first-order 
stochastic difference equation 
        ( 1 2 )  
P
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The evolution of public capital per efficiency unit worker is 
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Consequently, the ratio of the optimal paths for private and public capital stays 
constant over time.  This can be observed by taking the ratio of equation (13) to 
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(iv)  Long-run growth 
Substitution of equation (14) into (12) gives the essential difference equation 
for the evolution of private capital 
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Under constant returns to scale to reproducible factors, where  1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α , the 
steady-state ( ) growth rate of private capital will be given by  t
P
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−
, which is perpetual and non-explosive.
6  Also, output and 
public capital will grow at the same rate as private capital, with constant returns to 
scale Cobb-Douglas technology. 
                                                 
5 See Theorem 4.5 in Stokey and Lucas (1989, 76-77). 
6 See Lau and Sin (1997, p.129) 
6  
(v)  Time series properties of the model 
Equations (12) and (13) can be written in natural logarithm and substitution of 
these into the stochastic investment equations in (3) and (4) yields:    
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Multiplying equation (16) by ( ) 1 L θ −  on both sides, where L is the lag operator, and 
substituting for  t g L ˆ ln ) 1 ( θ −  from equation (17) yields an equilibrium dynamic 
equation of the log of per capita private capital expressed in terms of its own lags and 
the external shocks, 
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Similarly, multiplying equation (17) by [ ] ) ( 1 L θφ α − −  on both sides, and substituting 
for   from equation (16) yields the equilibrium path for aggregate 
public capital, 
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  Also, taking logs of the equation for the private production function in 
equation (3), multiplying this by  [ ] { } 1( 1 ) L αφ θ −+ −  and expressing this in per 
worker terms, yields 
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This equation describes the equilibrium path of the log of output per worker,  .  t y ln
 
7 (a)  Perpetual and stable growth at steady state  
In this growth model, growth in per capita output or income depends on the 
coefficient of the lagged output variable,  θ φ α ) 1 ( − + .  This is also the sum of all the 
exponents (or what is loosely known as the factor shares in neoclassical terms) of the 
private and public inputs into production.  There will be no perpetual growth in the 
per capita variables once the economy reaches the steady-state path, if 
1 ) 1 ( < − + θ φ α , since the effects of past disturbances decay successively in equation 
(20).  Conversely, the steady-state growth path will be explosive if  1 ) 1 ( > − + θ φ α .  
In this case there is increasing returns to all inputs.  
To obtain perpetual growth with stability in the model, it is a requirement that 
1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α  and  .  This is the strict endogenous growth case.  Thus, even if 
private production displays diminishing returns to private inputs, overall it 
experiences constant returns to scale due to the spillover effect from public capital.   
Hence there are two empirical properties to be expected of the variables in the 
endogenous growth case.  First, the sequences { ,   and {  will be 
exact unit root processes.  Second, and consequently, the first difference of the logs of 
the per capita variables will be white noise processes, if the linear combinations of the 
shocks in (18) to (20) are I(0). 
0 = x
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(b)  Derivation of cointegrating relationships 
If there are three I(1) variables in the system, there can be a maximum of two 
linearly independent cointegrating vectors.  For non-explosive, perpetual endogenous 
growth, it was concluded that  1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α .  Using this fact in equations (19) and 
(20), and then subtracting the former from the latter, and performing the same again 
on equation (18) and (20) gives the cointegrating space as 
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8 It is assumed that the linear combination of the external impulses is I(0).  If the 
cointegrating space in equation (21) and (22) is rejected, then there may be at most 
one cointegrating vector.  This cointegrating equation is a linear combination of all 
the variables.  This is shown by multiplying equation (21) on both sides by  ) 1 ( θ − , 
and equation (22) on both sides by θ , and then summing the two equations, to obtain 
  [ ] 12 ln (1 )ln ln (1 ) ln
P
tt t yk g t θ θθ θ −− − − −Λ + Λ=ε     (23) 
The cointegrating equation in (23) also represents the production function at steady 
state with non-explosive, perpetual growth.  In general, without assuming 
1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α , the single unrestricted cointegrating equation can be derived from 
equation (3) yielding: 
  [ ] ( )
P
t t t t A t x g k y ε θ φ α θ θφ α ln ln ) ) 1 ( ( 1 ln ln ) ( ln = − − + − − − − −  (24) 
Note that (23) is a nested case of (24) where (23) was derived under the hypothesis of 
1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α .  These possible cointegrating relationships will be tested in Section 
III of this paper. 
 
III.  Evidence for Australia 
(i)  Data 
The empirical analysis in this Part uses annual time series from 1930/31 to 
1990/91 for Australia.  It is important, for the purposes of testing for cointegrating 
relationships, to have a longer series as opposed to a more frequently sampled series.
7  
Real GDP ($mil) at 1966/67 constant prices is constructed from two series obtained 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia Preliminary Annual Database, Table R7701-3 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics Time-Series, Table 5204.01.  Data for net 
public capital stock ($mil at 1966/67 constant prices) is obtained from the RBA 
Preliminary Annual Database, Table R7701-10.  From this Table, public capital stock 
is taken to be the stock of plant and equipment, and railway.  Netting these of 
depreciation, and summing up, yields the net public capital stock estimates.  This 
series is appended to another series from the ABS Catalogue 5221.7 and 5221.8, for 
public enterprises and general government net stocks of non-dwelling construction 
and equipment capital, respectively.  The sources of private net capital stock ($mil at 
1966/67 constant prices) are the RBA Preliminary Annual Database, Table R7701-8 
                                                 
7 See Hakkio and Rush (1991).  
9 and the ABS Catalogue 5221.5.  The former provides for private stocks of gross plant 
and equipment, non-dwelling construction capital and depreciation.  The latter 
contains net stocks of non-dwelling construction and equipment capital.  Finally, data 
on civilian employment (`000 persons) is obtained from the RBA Australian Economic 
Statistics, Table 4.10c. 
 
(a)  Weak stationarity of the series 
Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979, 1981) unit root test, all the 
variables appear to be first-difference stationary.  This is reported in Table 1. 
 
 (ii)  Cointegration and output elasticity estimates 
In this section, the long-run relationship between the series, ln y, ln k and ln g, 
will be determined.  The Johansen (1991, 1995) multivariate cointegration method is 
used.  It should be noted that the Johansen test is sensitive to the specification of the 
lag-length for the Vector Error Correction (VEC) framework.  A VEC(2) framework 
is chosen after preliminary tests of up to four lags in the VEC yields the smallest 
Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC = -11.68) with the VEC(2) specification.  The 
second step involves testing for the existence of the cointegrating equations. The 
single cointegrating equation (24) is estimated as  
Table 1: Unit root tests 
  ∆lnyt  ∆lnkt  ∆lngt 





with constant and trend 
ADF statistic  -5.680  -3.014  -3.925 
5% critical value  -2.913  -2.911  -3.486 
AIC -3.741  -5.034  -3.083 
5 4 3 2 ln ln ln β β β β + + + = t g k y t t t .      (25) 
The test for this cointegrating relationship is reported in Table 2. 
10 From Table 2, the null hypothesis that there is no cointegrating equation can 
be rejected at even the 1 per cent level, since the trace statistic from the likelihood 
ratio test exceeds the 1 per cent critical value.  The null that there is at most one 
cointegrating relationship, as against the alternative of two cointegrating equations is 
rejected at the 5 per cent level but cannot be rejected at the 1 per cent level.  Using the 
more stringent 1 per cent test, it can be concluded that there is only one cointegrating 
equation of the form in equation (24).  The cointegrating relationship, normalised with 
respect to ln y, is 
Table 2: Johansen cointegration test   
Series: ln y ln k ln G  
VAR(2) 
  λtrace  5 per cent  1 per cent  Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue  Critical  Value  Critical Value
ℵ  No. of CE(s) 
0.4511  62.41  42.44  48.45      r = 0 ** 
0.2659 27.61  25.32  30.45     r ≤ 1 * 
0.1538 9.685  12.25  16.26  r ≤ 2 
Note: 
ℵ Critical values as tabulated in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).   *(**) represents 
rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%(1%). 
      (25’)  ln 0.0019ln 0.1021ln 0.0173 0.7877 ttt ykg t =++ +
The model estimated in (25’) can be compared with the restricted (endogenous 
growth) model under the case where  1 3 2 = + β β and  0 4 = β .  These parameter 
restrictions correspond to the restriction  1 ) 1 ( = − + θ φ α  on equation (24).  The 
calculated likelihood ratio statistic is 10.92, which follows a   distribution with two 
degrees of freedom ( ).  Therefore, the hypothesis of the endogenous 
growth model in (23) can be rejected in favour of the exogenous growth model with 




2 , 05 . 0 = χ
The parameter   represents the size of the spillover effect of public 
capital on output.  This value is about a quarter of the estimates by Aschauer (1989) 
and Otto and Voss (1994a).  It is close to the estimate of the elasticity of output with 
respect to public infrastructure for the US in Lau and Sin (1997).   
10 . 0 ˆ
3 = = β θ
  In this section, it was found that there is evidence of public capital spillover 
effects on aggregate production.  However, this effect is small compared to claims in 
earlier studies for the US and Australia such as Aschauer (1989) and Otto and Voss 
11 (1994a), respectively.  In the following section, the VEC(2) model incorporating (25’) 
is used to study short-run dynamics and interactions between the variables.   
 
IV.  Short-run dynamics and impulse response 
Aschauer (1989a) pointed out the possibility of reverse causation between the 
level of public capital expenditure and production. That is, ln g responds to rises in ln 
y.  This example of Wagner’s Law arises if expenditure on public infrastructure or 
public goods is a superior good.
8 
Furthermore, there may also be interactions between ln g and ln k.  On the one 
hand, public capital expenditure may be seen as the springboard for private 
investment.  This runs counter to standard elementary macroeconomic argument that 
government expenditure tends to crowd out private investment.  However, it may be 
that public capital increases the marginal product of private capital.  An obvious 
example is the provision of better highways, which results in less wear and tear of 
private vehicles while goods are transported more efficiently.  On the other hand, 
public capital expenditure may be seen as responding to private investment demands.  
Impulse response analysis of the VEC(2) model is used to provide some 
insights into the interactions between these variables in the short run.  In particular, 
the interest is in the effect of  ln g on ln k and ln y.   
 
(ii)  Impulse response analysis and variance decomposition 
In performing an impulse response of the VEC(2) model, a simulation period 
of up to fifty years and an ordering of (ln g, ln k, ln y) is used.  Since the variables are 
in logarithms, each 0.01 unit change in the response functions denotes a 1 per cent 
change.  From Figure 1, ln y responds negatively to a one-period (positive) shock to g 
and, after the initial six periods, positively to g.  Time taken for agents to readjust to 
capture the positive externality of public infrastructure investment may possibly 
explain the initial negative response of ln y to ln g.
9  The response of  ln y to ln g 
reaches a 2 per cent (permanently) higher level after 20 years.  The ln g shock has 
permanent effects on ln y due to the existence of a unit root in the series.   
Also, ln k responds positively to ln g  from the beginning. Thus, there is 
evidence of public infrastructure crowding in private investment, which affirms 
                                                 
8 See Olekalns (1999) for interest. 
12 Aschauer  (1989b).  As an aside, there does not appear to be evidence of Wagner’s 
Law, if not to the contrary (as ln g responds negatively to ln y).   
The influence of ln g can further been seen in the variance decomposition of 
the 50-period forecast error of the variables in the system in Figure 2.  It can be 
observed that up to about 50 per cent of the forecast error in ln y i s  d u e  t o  t h e  
innovation to ln g and about 70 per cent of the forecast error of ln g is due to its own 
innovation.  There is a relatively lower contribution of ln g to the forecast error of ln 
k.  Therefore, it can be concluded from the impulse response analysis and variance 
decompositions that public infrastructure investment does impact positively on per 
worker income in the short to medium term. 
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9 See e.g. David (1990).  
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V.  Conclusions 
It was the aim in this paper to study the effect of public infrastructure on the 
aggregate economy in terms of long-run growth and short-run effects.  In particular, 
the issue was whether growth was determined in the long run, in part, by the 
accumulation of the stock of public infrastructure.  A simple stochastic growth model 
nesting exogenous and endogenous growth with public capital spillovers was 
considered in Section II of the paper.   
The long-run implication of this model was tested empirically for Australia in 
Section III.  It was found that there was evidence of cointegration between per worker 
output, per worker private capital and per worker public capital.  A nested test of the 
strictly endogenous growth model was rejected in favour of the exogenous growth 
model with public infrastructure spillovers as evidenced by the existence of a time 
trend.  
Lastly, the cointegrating relationship was incorporated into a vector error-
correction model to study the short-run behaviour of the variables in Section IV.  It 
was found that innovations to public infrastructure induce permanently higher levels 
14 of output and private investment in both the short and the long run.  The forecast error 
variance of per capita output is also largely due to that of public infrastructure, under 
a variance decomposition of the statistical model.  Therefore, there is evidence that 
the accumulation of public capital can have positive short to long term effects on 
economic growth, a conclusion which is in line with the existing empirical literature.   
 
 
15 APPENDIX A: Dynamic programming for the household problem 
The method of solving the household’s intertemporal utility maximization problem 
subject to given constraints and public policy in equation (6) is as follows.  Bellman’s 
(1957) principle of optimality dictates that if the sequence of {  is 
maximising, then it must also be the case that it maximises the functional over 
}
∞
= + 0 1 ˆ , ˆ
t t t k c
{ } 1 ˆ k 0, ˆ c  
and { .  Hence the problem in equation (6) can be written as   }
∞
= + 1 1 ˆ , ˆ
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t t k V c k V
t t
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subject to the constraints (6)(a)-(c). 
  A guess of the solution to (A.1) is 
      ( A . 2 )   ) ln( ) ˆ ln( ) , ˆ ( 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 ε ε B k B B k V + + =
Substituting the form of equation (A.2) into (A.1) gives 
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subject to constraints (6)(a)-(c). 
 At  time  t, the control variables,  and  , and the state variables,  t c ˆ 1 ˆ
+ t k t ε  and  , 
are all known.  Further, with the assumption that ln(ε
t k ˆ
t) is independently and 
identically distributed such that  0 ) ln( E 1 = + t t ε , the terms in the curly brackets of 
equation (A.3) can be reduced to  
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 + + + ) ˆ ln( E ) ˆ ln( 1 1 0 t t t k B B c β
  Define the Lagrangian as 
     

 
 − − − +  

 
 + + = +
−
+ 1 1 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ln( ) ˆ ln( t t
P
t t t t t t k c g k A k B B c L ε τ λ β
θ θφ α
and the first-order conditions for maximisation are 
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and the transversality condition 
16   .  0 ˆ lim 1 = + ∞ → t
t
t k β
Substitute equations (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.7) to get: 
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Use the natural constraint (A.7) and (A.8) to derive the stochastic difference 
equation for private capital per efficiency unit worker: 
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Substitute equations (A.8) and (A.9) into the RHS of the Bellman equation (A.3) to 
verify that the LHS of equation (A.3) 
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Expanding terms on the RHS: 
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For the functional to be valid, the LHS must, inter alia, satisfy the condition that  
  ) 1 )( ( 1 1 B B β θφ α + − =  
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Substitute (A.10) into equations (A.8) and (A.9) to obtain the optimal household 
consumption and investment paths with given public policy: 
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17 APPENDIX B: The government’s problem and optimal outcomes 
  The government’s infinite horizon problem is defined here as a dynamic 
program.  That is, the maximized value of the household’s “welfare” is 
  {
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subject to (10)(a)-(d). 
Second, guess that the solution is of the form below: 
  .    (B.2)    ) ln( ) ˆ ln( ) ˆ ln( ) ˆ , ˆ ( 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 , 0 0 ε ε B g B k B B g k v + + + ≡
Utilising the guess in (B.2), re-write equation (B.1) as 
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subject to (B.1)(a) to (d).  It is also assumed here that  is white noise and 
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and the transversality condition 




Express the constraints (B.7) and (B.8) in terms of   and   respectively, and 
substitute these into equations (B.4) and (B.5) to obtain 
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Further substitution of equation (B.9) back into constraints (B.7) and (B.8) results in 
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   (B.12) 
Expand the RHS of equation (B.12) and collect terms 
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For the functional to be valid, that is the LHS=RHS in (B.12), it must be that the 
coefficients on the LHS of (B.12) satisfy, inter alia  
  ) 1 )( ( 2 1 1 B B B β β θφ α + + − =  
  ) 1 ( 2 1 2 B B B β β θ + + = . 
Solving for B1 and B2 yields 
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Substitution of equation (B.13) and (B.14) into (B.9), (B.10) and (B.11) gives 
the equations of the evolution of private and public capital: 
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